The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...) aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...) to reasons to act. Pragmatists who want to preserve a motivational constraint on reasons therefore have exactly two options: either arguing that there are irreducible reasons for being in non-intentional states ; or arguing that we can believe directly for practical reasons. I argue that the prospects for the former option are dim because irreducible reasons to be in states are hard to square with the motivational constraint on reasons. Returning to the more traditional route of arguing for pragmatism by defending a version of doxastic voluntarism therefore seems to be the more promising way for pragmatists to go. (shrink)

Eva Schmidt argues that facts about incoherent beliefs can be non-evidential epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. In this commentary, I argue that incoherence-based reasons to suspend are epistemically superfluous: if the subjects in Schmidt’s cases ought to suspend judgment, then they should do so merely on the basis of their evidential reasons. This suggests a more general strategy to reduce the apparent normativity of coherence to the normativity of evidence. I conclude with some remarks on the independent interest that reasons-first (...) epistemology might have within an evidentialist framework. (shrink)

The author defends the claim that there are cases in which we should promote irrationality by arguing (1) that it is sometimes better to be in an irrational state of mind, and (2) that we can often influence our state of mind via our actions. The first claim is supported by presenting cases of irrational _belief_ and by countering a common line of argument associated with William K. Clifford, who defended the idea that having an irrational belief is always worse (...) than having a rational one. In support of the second claim, the author then explains how the control we have over our beliefs could look like. In conclusion, the author suggests that the argument of this essay is not restricted to the irrationality of beliefs, but can be applied to irrational states of mind in general. In an outlook on the “ethics of belief” debate, the author points out that the argument of this essay need not conflict with evidentialism, but does so when combined with another plausible claim about the meaning of doxastic ought-statements. (shrink)

In the traditional understanding, human dignity is often portrayed as a «final», «inherent», and «absolute» value. If human dignity as the core of the status of a human being did indeed have thos characteristics, this would yield a severe limitation for obligations that stem from the moral status of non-human animals, plants, eco systems and other entities discussed in environmental ethics; for obligations that arise from human dignity standardly take priority over the duties toward entities with non-human moral status. Yet, (...) many theorists of human dignity nowadays have given up the traditional picture in favour of a more «contingent» understanding of human dignity that abandons one or more of its traditional characteristics.In this paper, I argue that to the contrary, we have good reasons to think that the three characteristics of human dignity just mentioned can indeed be attributed to a value that deserves the name «human dignity». In a first part, I argue for a specific understanding of the three value characteristics under consideration. After these preliminaries, I show in a second part that given such an understanding, we have ample evidence that we can indeed say that human dignity is an inherent, absolute and final value; and also that these three characteristics are properties of a single value. (shrink)

COVID-19 vaccine refusal seems like a paradigm case of irrationality. Vaccines are supposed to be the best way to get us out of the COVID-19 pandemic. And yet many people believe that they should not be vaccinated even though they are dissatisfied with the current situation. In this paper, we analyze COVID-19 vaccine refusal with the tools of contemporary philosophical theories of responsibility and rationality. The main outcome of this analysis is that many vaccine-refusers are responsible for the belief that (...) they should not be vaccinated and epistemically rational in holding it. This is an important result because it provides insights into the legitimacy of certain public health policies. In particular, this result shows that a public health policy that would abandon the project of convincing certain vaccine-refusers with reasons – e.g., by simply making vaccination compulsory – is prima facie illegitimate. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v57-luft.

Sebastian Gardner; III*—Other Minds and Embodiment, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 35–52, https://doi.org/10.10.

A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03136-1.

An exponential $\exp $ on an ordered field $$. The structure $$ is then called an ordered exponential field. A linearly ordered structure $$ is called o-minimal if every parametrically definable subset of M is a finite union of points and open intervals of M.The main subject of this thesis is the algebraic and model theoretic examination of o-minimal exponential fields $$ whose exponential satisfies the differential equation $\exp ' = \exp $ with initial condition $\exp = 1$. This study (...) is mainly motivated by the Transfer Conjecture, which states as follows:Any o-minimal exponential field $$ whose exponential satisfies the differential equation $\exp ' = \exp $ with initial condition $\exp =1$ is elementarily equivalent to $\mathbb {R}_{\exp }$.Here, $\mathbb {R}_{\exp }$ denotes the real exponential field $$, where $\exp $ denotes the standard exponential $x \mapsto \mathrm {e}^x$ on $\mathbb {R}$. Moreover, elementary equivalence means that any first-order sentence in the language $\mathcal {L}_{\exp } = \{+,-,\cdot,0,1, <,\exp \}$ holds for $$ if and only if it holds for $\mathbb {R}_{\exp }$.The Transfer Conjecture, and thus the study of o-minimal exponential fields, is of particular interest in the light of the decidability of $\mathbb {R}_{\exp }$. To the date, it is not known if $\mathbb {R}_{\exp }$ is decidable, i.e., whether there exists a procedure determining for a given first-order $\mathcal {L}_{\exp }$ -sentence whether it is true or false in $\mathbb {R}_{\exp }$. However, under the assumption of Schanuel’s Conjecture—a famous open conjecture from Transcendental Number Theory—a decision procedure for $\mathbb {R}_{\exp }$ exists. Also a positive answer to the Transfer Conjecture would result in the decidability of $\mathbb {R}_{\exp }$. Thus, we study o-minimal exponential fields with regard to the Transfer Conjecture, Schanuel’s Conjecture, and the decidability question of $\mathbb {R}_{\exp }$.Overall, we shed light on the valuation theoretic invariants of o-minimal exponential fields—the residue field and the value group—with additional induced structure. Moreover, we explore elementary substructures and extensions of o-minimal exponential fields to the maximal ends—the smallest elementary substructures being prime models and the maximal elementary extensions being contained in the surreal numbers. Further, we draw connections to models of Peano Arithmetic, integer parts, density in real closure, definable Henselian valuations, and strongly NIP ordered fields.Parts of this thesis were published in [2–5].Abstract prepared by Lothar Sebastian KrappE-mail: sebastian[email protected]: https://d-nb.info/1202012558/34. (shrink)

En este trabajo se presentan criterios que permiten estimar parámetros de desinfección mediante el uso de luz ultravioleta UV-C de onda corta, en agua, aire y superficies. Se indican métodos para evaluar la dosificación en función de la potencia de la lámpara empleada. Este tipo de estrategia permiten resultados de hasta 99.9% de desinfección, inactivando diferentes tipos de microorganismos. Estas referencias sirven de base para el diseño de dispositivos de utilidad en la presente emergencia por COVID-19, cuyo origen, al ser (...) viral, es susceptible al mismo método de desinfección debido al proceso de dimerización del ADN, donde el daño producido en la estructura celular, afecta la capacidad de reproducción y de funcionalidad. Palabras Clave: luz UV-C o germicida, desinfección UV, dimerización del ADN. Referencias [1]R. Wallace, M. Ouellette and J. Jean, "Effect of UV‐C light or hydrogen peroxide wipes on the inactivation of methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus, Clostridium difficile spores and norovirus surrogate", Journal of Applied Microbiology, vol. 127, no. 2, pp. 586-597, 2019. [2]J. Vargas, "Efecto de la radiación gamma sobre las características físico - químicas, sensoriales y microbiológicas en páprika en polvo ", Revista ECIPeru, pp. 68-71, 2019. [3]M. Ángeles García y P. Fernández, "Luz ultravioleta e inmunidad", Piel, vol. 21, no. 8, pp. 367-368, 2016. [4]W. Pachuau y R. Tiwari, " Deep Ultraviolet Light Emitting Diodes: Physics, Performance, and Applications", ECS Meetings, 2014. [5]W. Kowalski, Ultraviolet Germicidal Irradiation Handbook, 5th ed. Berlin: Springer Berlin, 2014, pp. 1-13. [6]W. Kowalski, Ultraviolet Germicidal Irradiation Handbook, 5th ed. Berlin: Springer Berlin, 2014, pp. 17-47. [7]"Germicidal Ultraviolet ", Media.ies.org, 2020. [En línea]. Disponible en: https://media.ies.org/docs/standards/IES%20CR-2-20-V1a-20200507.pdf. [Último acceso: 16 de junio de 2020]. [8]J. Bolton y C. Cotton, The ultraviolet disinfection handbook, 3rd ed. Denver, Colo.: American Water Works Association, 2008, pp. 13-33. [9]W. Kowalski, Ultraviolet Germicidal Irradiation Handbook, 5th ed. Berlin: Springer Berlin, 2014, pp. 8-9. [10]P. Aguirre, J. García y R. Mujeriego Sahuquillo, "Desinfección con cloro y luz UV en un proceso convencional de regeneración de agua", Ingeniería del agua, vol. 11, no. 1, p. 75, 2004. (shrink)

Mind, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab001.

Does Wittgenstein have a method? There are two challenges to an affirmative answer. One is put forth by Schulte, who claims that Wittgenstein’s method is little more than a skill, and thus not a method in any ambitious sense of that word. Another is Conant’s view that the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein entertains not one method, but a variety of methods. I tackle these challenges by questioning what I take to be their presupposed conceptions of ‘method’ and conclude that (...) we can indeed speak of Wittgenstein’s method in an interesting sense. Thereby, the concept of method will be elucidated and the sense in which Wittgenstein’s philosophy has a method clarified. (shrink)

Fred Dretske’s account of mental causation, developed in Explaining Behavior and defended in numerous articles, is generally regarded as one of the most interesting and most ambitious approaches in the field. According to Dretske, meaning facts, construed historically as facts about the indicator functions of internal states, are the structuring causes of behavior. In this article, we argue that Dretske’s view is untenable: On closer examination, the real structuring causes of behavior turn out to be markedly different from Dretske’s meaning (...) facts. Our argument proceeds in three steps. First, we set forth the problem of meaning individuation: We argue that the proposal that meaning facts are structuring causes of behavior commits Dretske to a very fine-grained individuation of meanings that is deeply counterintuitive. In a second step, we show that even these finely individuated meaning facts cannot do the job that they are supposed to do, since information facts—which are constitutive of, but distinct from Dretske’s meaning facts—are better candidates for the role of structuring causes. Finally, we argue that it is not even information facts, but facts of co-instantiation which are the real structuring causes of behavior. In concluding, we briefly consider the options that are left for Dretske if our arguments succeed. (shrink)

This book argues that Adorno's writings allow us to address what is arguably the central challenge of modern philosophy: how to picture a world beyond suffering and injustice without betraying its vital impulse. By re-appraising his writings on politics, philosophy, and art, Sebastian Truskolaski reconstructs Adorno's overall project from a radically new perspective. Taking his 'standpoint of redemption' at its starting point, whilst also dealing with his recurrent reference to the Old Testament ban on images, this book brings Adorno's (...) central concerns to bear on debates about Utopia that have come to define political visions across the political spectrum. (shrink)

The sensorimotor account of perception is akin to Gibsonian direct realism. Both emphasize external properties of the world, challenging views based on the analysis of internal visual processing. To compare the role of distal and retinotopic parameters, distractor effect – an optomotor reaction of midbrain origin – is considered. Even in this case, permanence in the environment, not on the retina, explains the dynamics of habituation.

This paper analyses the emergence and persistence of disorder due to bellicose (i.e. ‘conflict-kindling’) institutions. It does so relying on a novel empirical approach, examining the predatory and productive interactions of 400,000 users of a virtual world as well as its institutions. The paper finds that while there are many cases of spontaneous order in that virtual world, and while the users are not more conflict-loving as such, bellicose institutions sanctioning suicidal attacks in a supposedly safe region spontaneously emerged and (...) rigidly persist, thus upholding disorder (i.e. a particularly violent kind of ordered anarchy). (shrink)

In this comment a challenge Kerr’s claim that a coherent expression of a ‘liberalism of freedom’ needs an extended first Rawlsian principle of justice incorporating the principle of fair equality of opportunity for two reasons. First, such an extended first principle leads to illiberal consequences by narrowing down the scope of individual responsibility for choice and effort way too much. Second, such an extended first principle misses a main Rawlsian insight, namely that in a theory of justice the principle securing (...) basic liberties and the principle of fair equality of opportunity serve different purposes. (shrink)

This article focuses on the question of whether the task of the security authorities to protect public safety can justify unlawful encroachments on fundamental rights committed by them. First, the concept of security is analysed and criticised. This is followed by an analysis of the normative compatibility of the concept of security with the legal system. In particular, the legal principles and the concepts of possibility, probability and risk as standards of assessment for the justification of encroachments on fundamental rights (...) by security authorities as well as predictive policing as measures for determining the concepts are discussed. It is shown that the task of the security authorities to protect public safety cannot justify unlawful encroachments on fundamental rights in any way. (shrink)

The surplus of impulses is a key category in Gehlen’s anthropobiology to understand the process of hominisation and humanisation. From the dedifferentiation of human instincts and the primitivisation of man’s anatomy, to the role of experience, institutions, and speech, the surplus of impulses is a source that flows between the inner and the outer, by feeding the action circle that whether translates in activity or is redirected inwards in order to become a movement of volitional constitution. The ambivalence in which (...) Gehlen deals with this function of freedom gives rise to a pessimistic and sacrificial idea of man. However, he posits certain basic elements of a hedonistic theory of speech from which we can better understand the stabilizing task of language as cornerstone of institutions. (shrink)

In this article, I would like to use the case of Rudolf Eucken to examine how the historiography of philosophy, and especially the interpretation of German Idealism, became a medium of national self-assurance. By referring to the philosophical classics of German Idealism, Eucken, at the end of the 19th century, develops a model of a publicly effective philosophy to which he ascribes the task of contributing to the recovery of unity and strength. My aim is to work out the social (...) background and the social function of this characterisation of the history of philosophy. The thesis I would like to develop is that Eucken, in reaction to his perception of social crises and the inner-scientific questioning of the role of philosophy, attempts to establish philosophy as a fundamental element of the historical discourse and practices of the new German nation state. This historical discourse, into which philosophy attempts to inscribe itself, can be interpreted, following Durkheim’s sociological reflections on religion, as an attempt to sacralise the nation. This reveals the social function of this form of philosophical historiography: it becomes the theology of the new German nation state. (shrink)

En este artículo se presentan las reflexiones epistemológicas del filósofo Francisco Fernández Buey (1943-2012), las cuales, han estado continuamente presentes en la obra del autor al menos desde la publicación en 1991 de La ilusión del método, y culminan en su obra póstuma Para la tercera cultura (2013) en una apuesta por la complementariedad entre ciencias positivas y reflexión humanística. Partiendo de un marxismo heterodoxo tanto en el plano ético-político como en el epistemológico, Fernández Buey apuesta por una idea de (...) ciencia alejada del positivismo, a la vez que critica las filosofías contrarias a aquella en la medida en que la consideran como un conocimiento meramente reductor de una realidad que no puede ser aprehendida por la ciencia. Desde el concepto de dialéctica de Manuel Sacristán; el reconocimiento a la figura de Einstein como ejemplo de científico que no renuncia a otros modos de conocimiento; y la reflexión sobre la filosofía de la ciencia en la segunda mitad del siglo XX, el autor nos muestra la necesidad de un diálogo entre cultivadores de la ciencia y las humanidades para afrontar los desafíos del siglo XXI. (shrink)

I argue that a radical constructivist approach might focus on providing us with what I call “tamed heuristics.” This would make our fast and intuitive evaluation more reliable in that it leads ….

This article is a contribution to the history of the Geiger-Müller counter, based on the replication method. Along with a historical analysis of the Geiger-Müller counter I present and discuss my experience with replicas of early counters from 1928. The explicit and tacit knowledge that was gained during my construction und the experimentation process allows a different view of the development process in 1928. Against this background, I discuss Walter Müller’s role in the development and the significance of experimental work (...) in Geiger’s laboratory by illustrating the status of data gained from indirect electrical measurements in the field of early radioactivity research. All things considered it was not the instrument itself, but Geiger’s influence and status that affected its establishment in the scientific community in an authoritative way. (shrink)

During the Second World War, through innovations in officer selection and group therapy, the army psychiatrists John Rickman and Wilfred Bion changed our understanding of leadership. They showed how soldiers under stress could develop real authority through their attentiveness to each other. From contrasting experiences 25 years earlier each had seen how people in groups are moved by elemental forces that undermine judgement and thought. This article arose from my experiences as a trainee at the Tavistock Clinic, where the method (...) of reflective work discussion, giving individuals seated in a circle the choice to speak or to remain silent, seemed similar to a Quaker meeting. Many decades later I found that this association had a basis in fact. Among other influences on Bion — a childhood in India, distinguished service in the First World War, and a surgical apprenticeship with Wilfred Trotter — there is a little-acknowledged Quaker source, in John Rickman, for Bion’s radical work in the army that led to new methods of training and organizational consultancy in the postwar Tavistock. (shrink)

The introduction charts Hans-Johann Glock’s academic career, introduces some of his core philosophical views, and provides an overview of the chapters included in the festschrift.

Many later thinkers in the Islamic world pick up on, and further expand, the idea of intuition (ḥads) as they react to Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā). Focusing on figures from the twelfth–thirteenth century, in this paper we will focus especially on the following points of debate: (1) Avicenna’s idea that intuition is distingiushed from normal (discursive) thought by lacking ‘motion’, (2) The question of how and why different individuals differ in the extent of their intuition, (3) The role of intuitive thought (...) in grounding knowledge: is intuition needed every time a certain item of knowledge is grasped for the first time, and hence without a teacher; and further, is intuition needed as an ultimate justification for all non-intuitive knowledge? (shrink)

The present article aims to analyze, from literary studies, the aspects of the life of Tomás Carrasquilla that, reflected in his historical novel La marquesa de Yolombó, contributed to the creation of Yolombó as a literary universe that exposes the tensions of creation identity of the Colombian nation. This purpose is achieved through three moments: the first, the identification of bibliographic sources that within literary criticism have addressed the biographical aspects of the author; the second, the exploration of the mining (...) route that led the first Spanish settlers, established in the municipality of Cancán, to migrate to neighboring municipalities such as Yolombó and Santo Domingo and, thirdly, the review of the influences of the oral accounts of the Carrasquilla family in the composition of the novel. It is concluded that the tragic fate that the character of Bárbara Caballero faces in the work may represent a rejection of the author towards the realistic spirit and submission to the Spanish crown of the legendary Marchioness. This hypothesis is based on the fact that the historical Bárbara, the writer's great-great-great aunt, was out of tune in the middle of a family that was favorable to the independence cause, such is the case of José María Córdova, distinguished hero of independence, related to Carrasquilla in the same degree of consanguinity as Bárbara Caballero. Finally, in methodological terms, this work is developed as a documentary investigation whose level is interpretive. (shrink)

Ragpickers are people who salvage usable items from other person’s rubbish, and they are spread over different localities all around the world. This raises numerous issues related to the dignity of human life, and the right to education. In addition to discussion of these issues, this paper includes an interview study on bioethics of 150 ragpickers engaged in collection of papers, bottles, waste plastic materials, scrap iron materials and so on in Tiruppur city, Tamil Nadu, India. Ragpickers are mostly children (...) below 14 years of age. The objectives of the study were to find out the socioeconomic conditions of ragpickers, to examine the effect of environment on their health conditions and to identify their problems at work. Society as a whole regards rag picking children as anti-social elements, an embarrassment to the community and unfit to live. However their useful contribution to society and ecology is little understood and generally ignored. The waste collected by these children is recycled and produces 25% of writing paper, the packing materials, egg trays, economic plastic and metal house hold items, and so on, used in our homes. Society and ecology benefit from the production of cheaper household goods, and the slowing down of the destruction of the already threatened rain forests. It also helps to prevent the mountains of putrifying waste materials from building up in city centres. The ragpickers valuable contribution to society should not be ignored and taken for granted. There are a number of ethical and human rights issues raised by this practice, which should not be condoned as ethically acceptable social attitudes to a child’s life. (shrink)

Si la teoría del derecho persigue suministrar herramientas a los operadores jurídicos para gestionar los problemas de la práctica, resulta necesario disminuir la actual separación entre la actividad teórico-jurídica y la práctica del derecho. De ahí que, este trabajo persigue contribuir a reducir dicha distancia mediante el análisis de las principales propuestas en materia de ontología de las normas. Esta revisión se realiza a la luz de un extendido problema de los ordenamientos jurídicos contemporáneos: la identificación del derecho y sus (...) limitaciones conceptuales. El examen explicita cierta concomitancia entre las propuestas teóricas y presenta una serie de consideraciones necesarias para identificar el derecho y, en concreto, contribuir a la solución del citado problema. De esta manera, se sugiere girar la discusión sobre la ontología de las normas hacia la identificación de ellas y evaluar las discusiones teórico-jurídicas con base en las exigencias de la práctica normativa. (shrink)

Evidence is currently mixed regarding the way in which cognitive conflict modulates the effect of emotion on task performance. The present study aimed to address methodological differences across previous studies and investigate the conditions under which interference from emotional stimuli can either be elicited or eliminated under high cognitive conflict. Four behavioural experiments were conducted with a university sample using a gender-discrimination stimulus-response compatibility task. In line with our previous findings, Experiment 1 found that when emotion and cognitive conflict conditions (...) were blocked, emotional faces increased reaction time interference during response compatible trials (low conflict) but not response incompatible trials (high conflict). However, when conflict and emotion conditions were randomised in different configurations across Experiments 2 (all trials randomised), 3 (emotion blocked, compatibility randomised) and 4 (compatibility blocked, emotion randomised), emotion interfered with task performance across both high and low conflict trials. These results suggest that predictability of both compatibility and emotion is required in order to obtain reduced emotional interference under high cognitive conflict. Consistent with prior reports, a top–down anticipatory control mechanism seems to be engaged in the presence of negative emotion when there are incompatible stimulus-response mappings. (shrink)

This text aims to offer a epistemic-normative reading of madness in Kant's work and its different developments throughout his work. This to maintain that madness arises from rationality itself when understood it as a force that exceeds the limits that reason imposes on itself. By outlining normality or mental sanity as the restriction of reason to sensibility, Kant intends -I maintain- to outline the minimum subjective and epistemic conditions for a republican political conformation, which is based on the agreement between (...) subjects about the rules that will regulate their actions and interactions. This reading will allow us to outline an understanding of the anti-vaccine protest that took place during the pandemic. Showing that those who promote and follow them break with this minimum agreement on the restrictions of reason, thus reaching selfish excesses that harm democratic dynamics. I concluded that these people can be understood as madness people who represent a danger to the republican and democratic political organization. (shrink)

En el marco del debate sobre los lineamientos fundamentales de la ética de Deleuze, diversos autores han reparado en nociones destacadas de su obra: el deseo, el devenir, la afirmación, el nomadismo. Mi propuesta en este artículo es desarrollar una vía poco estudiada, que gira alrededor de la idea de prudencia práctica experimental. Según mi hipótesis, este concepto reúne perspectivas relevantes de la producción deleuzeana posterior a L'Anti-Œdipe, en particular su orientación vitalista, su opción por la desubjetivación y su apelación (...) a una dimensión ascética vinculada con el deseo como impulsor de la experimentación. Within the realm of debate on fundamental layouts of Deleuze's ethics, several authors have concentrated on significant notions in his work: desire, becoming, affirmation, nomadism. In this article my proposal is to develop a road, scarcely studied yet, in connection with the idea of experimental practical prudence. Respect to my hypothesis, this concept assembles relevant perspectives of Deleuze's post L'Anti-Œdipe production, especially his orientation towards vitalism, his choice for desubjectivation and his appeal to an ascetic dimension linked to desire as motor to experimentation. (shrink)

This article explores the connections between analytic philosophy and applied ethics — both historical and substantive. Historically speaking, applied ethics is a child of analytic philosophy. It arose as the result of two factors in the 1960s: the re-emergence of normative ethics on the one hand, and urgent social and political challenges on the other. But is there a significant substantive link between applied ethics and analytic philosophy? I argue that applied ethics inherited important ‘analytic’ ideals such as clarity and (...) argumentative rigour.At the same time these ideals are not the exclusive preserve of analytic philosophy and applied ethics. Moreover, they are under threat from various trends within applied ethics. In this context I rebut the allegation that the anti-revisionist reliance on pre-theoretical moral judgements (aka ‘intuitions’) is less rational than their revisionist dismissal.The article ends with a plea for an analytic approach within applied ethics. (shrink)